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This study discusses choice behavior using a voting model in which voters can obtain infor-
mation from a finite number of previous r voters. Voters vote for a candidate with a probability
proportional to the previous vote ratio, which is visible to the voters. We obtain the Pitman
sampling formula as the equilibrium distribution of r votes. We present the model as a process
of posting on a bulletin board system, 2ch.net, where users can choose one of many threads
to create a post. We explore how this choice depends on the last r posts and the distribution
of these last r posts across threads. We conclude that the posting process is described by our
voting model with analog herders for a small r, which might correspond to the time horizon
of users’ responses.
1. Introduction
In physics, equilibrium states are comparatively well understood, whereas non-
equilibrium states continue to attract much attention.1–3) The latter states pose several in-
teresting problems, and clarifying and classifying the nature of non-equilibrium stationary
states continues to be a central research theme.4) In other disciplines, the non-equilibrium
stationary state is referred as the equilibrium state. The ecology literature highlights that the
equilibrium state in a zero sum model, in which the total number of individuals is constant,
is an important process.5) The economics literature discusses the equilibrium state in which
companies survive competitive conditions.6, 7)
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The Ewens sampling formula is a one-parameter probability distribution on the set of
all partitions of an integer.8) The Pitman sampling formula is a two-parameter extension of
the Ewens sampling formula.9) The Pitman-Yur process10) and a generalized Po´lya urn11) are
the non-equilibrium stochastic processes that derive the Pitman sampling formula.9) These
processes permit new entries of individuals and an increasing number of them. In a similar
non-equilibrium process in which the number of species or vertices increases, a power-law
distribution can be obtained.12–14)
We introduced a sequential voting model in previous studies.15) At each time step t, one
voter chooses one of two candidates. In addition, the tth voter can see the previous r votes,
and, thus, is given access to public perception. When the voters vote for a candidate with a
probability that is proportional to the previous referable votes and there are two candidates,
the model can be considered as Kirman’s ant colony model.16) In these previous studies, a
beta-binomial distribution was derived as the equilibrium distribution of the r referable votes
in the stationary state of the process.17) If we assume that voters can refer to all votes, the
process becomes a non-equilibrium process. The equilibrium distribution and the probability
distribution in the non-equilibrium process are the same.15)
The response function is important for opinion dynamics, and decision-making depends
on social influence. In this study, we consider the case of analog herders who vote for a
candidate with a probability that is proportional to the referable votes. We refer to the response
function in this case as an analog type.
On the other hand, threshold rules have been used to influence response functions in a
variety of relevant theoretical scenarios.18–22) This rule posits that individuals will choose
one of two choices only when a sufficient number of other individuals have adopted that
choice. We refer to such individuals as digital herders. From our experiments, we observe that
people’s individual behavior falls between that of digital herders and that of analog herders.
In this study, we show that people behave as analog herders when posting to a bulletin board
system.
We extend Kirman’s ant colony model when the number of candidates is greater than
two and not fixed.15, 16) The model is a finite reference version of the Pitman-Yor process
and the generalized Po´lya urn model.10, 11) We derive the Pitman sampling formula as an
equilibrium distribution. As a comprehensive example of the model, we analyze time series
data for posts on 2ch.net and electoral data for the Japanese House of Representatives. In
the former case, votes and candidates in the voting model correspond to posts on bulletin
boards and the bulletin boards’ threads. When r is small, the posting process is described by
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the voting model. For the parliament election data, the number of candidates is fixed. Using
the Pitman sampling formula, we compare the correlation between votes before and after the
introduction of the small constituency system in 1993.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces a voting model, and
we derive the Pitman sampling formula as an equilibrium distribution of votes. Sec. 3 then
presents the characteristics of several parameters. Sec. 4 studies time series data for posts on
2ch.net using the voting model, and Sec. 5 concludes. Appendix A studies the case in which
the number of candidates is fixed. Appendix B examines Japanese election data as a case in
which the number of candidates is fixed. Appendix C and Appendix D provide information
on the 2ch.net data and supplementary results of the data analysis.
2. Model
We examine choice behavior using a voting model with candidates C1,C2, · · · . At time t,
candidateC j has c j(t) votes. At each time step, a voter votes for one candidate, and the voting
is sequential. Thus, at time t, the tth voter votes, after which the total number of votes is t.
Voters are allowed to see the r previous votes for each candidate, where r is a constant, and,
thus, voters are aware of public perception. The candidates are allowed to both enter and exit.
The voter votes for the new candidate Ci with probability (θ + Krα)/(θ + r), where r is the
number of referred votes and Kr is the number of candidates who have more than one vote
in the last r votes. α and θ are parameters. If a candidate does not have more than one vote
in the last r votes, he/she exits. i in Ci is the number of candidates who have appeared in the
past plus one. The number of candidates at t = 1 is one, and there is only one candidate C1.
In terms of the Chinese restaurant process or Hoppe’s urn process, we describe the voting
process as follows.9, 11, 23) At first, there is an urn with θ black balls in it. In each step, one ball
is drawn from the urn and two balls are placed back into the urn. In the first turn, a black ball
is drawn, and a ball of color 1 and the black ball are placed back into the urn. In subsequent
turns, if the drawn ball is black, a ball of another color that has not appeared in the past and
the black ball are returned to the urn, and if the drawn ball is not black, the ball is duplicated,
and the two balls are placed back into the urn. The difference between this voting model and
the Chinese restaurant process is that the voter refers to only the recently added r balls and
the black balls.
We illustrate the parameter space in Fig.1. θ is the parameter that controls the overall
probability of adding a new candidate, and α is the parameter that adjusts the entry probability
of new candidates according to the number of candidates Kr = K. When α < 0, the constraint
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Fig. 1. Parameter space α and θ. α is the parameter that adjusts the entry probability of new candidates as per
the number of candidates, Kr . θ is the parameter that controls the overall probability of adding a new candidate.
The dotted line is not included in the parameter space. When α < 0, the constraint θ = αK exists, and Kr cannot
exceed K.
θ = −αK exists.
We consider the case in which voters are analog herders. If c j(t) ≥ 1, the transition is
c j(t) = k → k + 1 : P j,k,t:l,t−r =
−α + (k − l)
θ + r
, (1)
where P j,k,t:l,t−rs are the probabilities of the process. The number of votes for C j at (t − r) is
c j(t − r) = l. Hence, if (k − l) = 0, candidate C j exits the system.
The process of a new candidate C j entering is
c j(t) = 0 → 1 : P j,k,t:l,t−r =
Krα + θ
θ + r
, (2)
where the number of candidates who have more than 0 votes is Kr.
When α ≥ 0, from (1) and (2), the constraints θ + α > 0 and 1 > α ≥ 0 exist. (See
Fig.1.) There is no upper limit on the number of candidates. When α > 0, the probability of
a new entry increases with an increase in Kr. When α = 0, the probability of a new entry
is constant. When α < 0, from (2), the constraint αK + θ = 0 exists. The probability of a
new entry decreases with an increase in Kr, and K is the upper limit of Kr. The number of
candidates with more than one vote does not exceed K. This model is similar to the model
that does not allow candidate entry, which is further discussed in Appendix A.
The distribution of c j(t) as the partition of integer t follows the Pitman sampling formula
in the generalized Po´lya urn model.9, 11) This is a non-equilibrium process, and the number of
votes increases. We focus not on the snapshot c j(t) but on the time series of state c j(t)−c j(t−r).
This is an equilibrium process, and the number of total votes is constant.
We consider a hopping rate among (r + 1) states kˆ j = k − l, kˆ j = 0, 1, · · · , r, and, here, we
focus on the state. At each t, the vote at time (t − r) is deleted, and a new one is obtained. kˆ j
is the number of votes that candidate C j obtained in the previous r votes.
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First, we consider the case kˆ j > 1. The transition is
kˆ j → kˆ j + 1 : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j+1,t =
r − kˆ j
r
−α + kˆ j
θ + r − 1
,
kˆ j → kˆ j − 1 : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j−1,t =
kˆ j
r
(θ + α) + (r − kˆ j − 1)
θ + r − 1
,
kˆ j → kˆ j : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j ,t = 1 − Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t − Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t. (3)
Pkˆ j ,kˆ j±1,t and Pkˆ j ,kˆ j,t are the probabilities of the process. Pkˆ j ,kˆ j±1,t is the product of the probabil-
ities of exit and entry.
We consider hopping from candidate Ci to C j.
kˆi → kˆi − 1, kˆ j → kˆ j + 1 : Pkˆi→kˆi−1,kˆ j→kˆ j+1,t =
kˆi
r
−α + kˆ j
θ + r − 1
,
kˆi − 1 → kˆi, kˆ j + 1 → kˆ j : Pkˆi−1→kˆi ,kˆ j+1→kˆ j ,t =
kˆ j + 1
r
−α + kˆi − 1
θ + r − 1
.
(4)
Here, we define µr(kˆ, t) as the distribution function of state kˆ at time t. The number of all
states is (r + 1). Using the fact that the process is reversible, in the equilibrium, we have
µr(kˆi, kˆ j, t)
µr(kˆi − 1, kˆ j + 1, t)
=
kˆ j + 1
kˆi
−α + kˆi − 1
−α + kˆ j
. (5)
We separate indexes i and j and obtain
µir(kˆi, t)
µir(kˆi − 1, t)
=
−α + kˆi − 1
kˆi
c,
µ
j
r(kˆ j + 1, t)
µ
j
r(kˆ j, t)
=
−α + kˆ j
kˆ j + 1
c, (6)
where c is a constant.
In the equilibrium, the number of candidates with kˆ j > 0 is Kr. We ignore candidates
with kˆ j = 0 and change the number of candidates and votes from C j, kˆ j to C˜m, k˜m, where
m = 1, · · · ,Kr, wherein k˜m > 0.
We can write the distribution as
µr(a˜,∞) =
 θ + r − 1r

−1
Kr∏
m=1
(1 − α)[k˜m]
k˜m!
µr(a˜ = (1, 1, · · · , 1)︸        ︷︷        ︸
Kr
,∞), (7)
where a˜ = (k˜1, · · · , k˜Kr) and x
[n] = x(x + 1) · · · (x + n − 1), which is the Pochhammer symbol.
Given (6), we can obtain the equilibrium condition between a˜ = (1, 1, · · · , 1)︸        ︷︷        ︸
Kr
= 1 and
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a˜ = (0, 0, · · · , 0)︸        ︷︷        ︸
Kr
= 0:
µir(a˜ = (
n︷   ︸︸   ︷
1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0),∞)
µir(a˜ = (1, · · · , 1︸   ︷︷   ︸
n−1
, 0, · · · , 0),∞)
=
θ + (n − 1)α
n
c, (8)
where n = 1, · · · ,Kr. Hence, we can obtain
µr(a˜ = 1,∞) =
Kr∏
m=1
θ + (m − 1)α
m
µr(a˜ = 0,∞) =
(θ)[Kr :α]
Kr!
, (9)
where x[n:α] = x(x + α) · · · (x + (n − 1)α). Therefore, we can write (7) as
µr(a˜,∞) =
 θ + r − 1r

−1
θ[Kr :α]
Kr!
r∏
j=1
(
(1 − α)[ j−1]
j!
)a j
, (10)
where a j is the number of candidates who have j votes. Therefore, the number of candidates∑r
j=1 a j = Kr and that of votes
∑r
j=1 ja j = r are related. Hereafter, we use a partition vector
aˆ = (a1, · · · , ar).
We consider the partitions of the integer Kr. To normalize, we add the following combi-
nation term, Kr!/a1! · · · ar!:
µr(aˆ,∞) =
r!θ[Kr :α]
θ[r]
r∏
j=1
(
(1 − α)[ j−1]
j!
)a j
1
a j!
. (11)
(11) is simply a Pitman sampling formula.9) In the limit α = 0, we can obtain the Ewens
sampling formula:8)
µr(aˆ,∞) =
r!
θ[r]
r∏
j=1
(
θ
j
)a j
1
a j!
. (12)
The Ewens sampling formula for the equilibrium process is presented in.6)
3. Four regions in the parameter space
In this section, we characterize four regions in the parameter space. The parameter θ
denotes the intensity of correlations, and α refers to the intensity of competition. In the upper
plane, newcomers increase with a rise in α. In the lower plane, the probability of the minimum
growing increases with a decrease in α.
We consider both an increase and a decrease in kˆ j. The probability of a decrease in votes
for candidate j is kˆ j/r, and that of an increase in votes for candidate j is (−α+ kˆ j)/(θ + r − 1),
as shown in (1). We consider the condition in which the probability of an increase is larger
6/29
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Fig. 2. Four regions in the parameter space and the average increase and decrease in each region.
than that of a decrease:
α ≤ −
kˆ j
r
(θ − 1). (13)
In this region, the number of votes increases on average.
We divide the parameter space into four regions, I ∼ IV , as shown in Fig. 2(a). To clarify
the regions, we define zone Ukˆ j as the region where the probability of an increase in votes is
larger than that of a decrease. Ukˆ j is defined in (13). Ur is α ≤ −(θ − 1), and U0 is α ≤ 0.
We define zone I, where α > 0 and α < (1 − θ), as Ur. In zone I, Ur ⊃ Ur−1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ U0.
We consider the case in which the parameter set x = (θ, α) is x ∈ Ul and x < Ul−1. In this
case, k j ≥ l is the increasing zone and k j < l the decreasing zone. If a candidate has more
than l votes, he/she can increase the number of votes and maintain his/her position. On the
other hand, it is difficult to increase votes if the candidate has less than l votes. We show the
average trend in Fig 2.(b). In this region, the leader in the trapped zone has an advantage. On
the other hand, the competition intensifies for newcomers as α increases.
We define zone II as α > 0 and α ≥ (1 − θ). In zone II, x < U0, · · · ,Ur. Furthermore, it
is difficult to increase the number of votes for every candidate and to be a stable leader. The
7/29
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zone becomes more competitively intense with an increase in α. In other words, it is possible
to adjust the competitive intensity and protect newcomers by adjusting α, which denotes the
number of newcomers.
In the plane in the lower half, there is a capacity limit and no newcomers. We define zone
III as α < 0 and α > (1−θ). When α < 0, U0 ⊃ U1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Ur. We consider the case in which
the parameter set x = (θ, α) is x ∈ Ul and x < Ul+1. In this case, kˆ j > l is the decreasing zone
and kˆ j ≤ l the increasing zone. It is easy to increase the number of votes to kˆ j = l, but it is
difficult to increase the number of votes above kˆ j = l + 1. In this region, it is also difficult to
be a stable leader.
We define zone IV as α < 0 and α ≤ (1 − θ). In this zone, x ∈ U0, · · · ,Ur. It is easy to
increase the votes for each candidate. In addition, this zone is competitive when the number
of members is fixed.
Next, we consider the Ewens sampling formula on the θ axis. When α = 0 and θ = 1, the
probabilities of an increase and decrease both become kˆ j/r. For any kˆ j, the probabilities of an
increase and decrease are equal. Thus, the correlation becomes ρ = 1/2 (see Appendix A),
and there is a uniform random permutation. The probability of an increase or a decrease is
proportional to the number of partitions.
When α = 0 and θ < 1 within the boundaries of zone IV, if candidates can enter, the
number of votes easily increases. In this zone, the correlation is high. When α = 0 and θ > 1
within the boundaries of zone II, it is difficult to increase the number of votes. Here, there is
a low correlation. In summary, there are numerous candidates who have few votes.
4. Data analysis of a bulletin board system
In this section, we examine the data of posts to a bulletin board system (BBS), 2ch.net.
2ch.net is the largest BBS in Japan and covers a wide range of topics. Each bulletin board
is separated by a field unit or a category, such as, for example, news, food and culture, and
net relations. Each category is further divided into genres, or boards, and each board contains
numerous threads, which are segregated by topics that belong to the board. Writing and view-
ing boards is done on a thread. There are about 900 boards on 2ch.net. It is possible to make
anonymous posts on all threads.
We study the time series of posts on the following ten boards: business news, East Asia
news, live news, music news, breaking news, digital camera, game, entertainment, interna-
tional affairs, and press. We label these boards as the No. 1, No. 2, · · · No. 10 boards, re-
spectively. The first five boards fall under the news category. Each board has several hundred
8/29
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Table I. Statistics of 2ch.net post data. The observation period, the total number of threads N, the average
number of posts per thread T/N, and its standard deviation (S.D.) are presented in the third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth columns, respectively. wMax in the seventh column lists the maximum number of posts on a thread. The
numerical value in the eighth column indicates the average lifetime of a thread [in days]. The lifetime is defined
as the difference between the last and first post date. sH is in the last column and indicates the time horizon,
which is defined in eq.(14).
No. Board Name Obs. Period N T/N S.D. wMax Lifetime sH[sec]
1 Business News Aug. 10, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 8,248 140 290 7,707 7.5 260.0
2 East Asia News Mar. 8, 2009–Aug.5, 2009 8,225 388 1,022 27,966 7.5 205.4
3 Live News Mar. 8, 2009–Aug. 5, 2009 15,307 53 333 30,443 2.0 95.1
4 Music News Mar. 8, 2009–Aug. 5, 2009 23,000 332 1,123 78,388 2.8 140.2
5 Breaking News Mar. 8, 2009–Dec.31, 2009 33,677 658 1,497 113,220 2.9 94.5
6 Digital Camera Aug. 10, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 835 527 1,530 33,494 251.4
7 Game Mar. 8, 2009–Aug. 10, 2009 1,371 241 286 2,043 132.6
8 Entertainment Aug. 10, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 1,464 134 1188 30999 35.4
9 Int. Affairs Aug. 10, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 688 233 241 1,000 1,123.8
10 Press Aug. 10, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 1,011 235 296 2,182 358.5
threads, and managers maintain the number of threads by removing old ones and replacing
them with new threads. The duration of a post on a thread is set to five days for the No. 4
and No. 5 boards. As a result, the lifetime of a thread is generally about a few days. One
cannot post more than 1,000 posts to a thread. Threads that no longer allow posts are deleted
from the thread lists of the boards, and managers prepare a new sequential thread using the
same thread title. The lifetime of a thread can therefore be longer than the abovementioned
duration, as the postable duration rule applies to descendant threads with a new start date. We
identify sequential descendant threads from a common ancestor thread as one thread. Table I
summarizes the statistics of the threads of the ten boards.
The total number of posts on each board is about 0.2–22 million. Each thread has an
average of several hundred posts, and the standard deviation is large. The maximum number
of posts wMax is 50–100 times larger than the average. The average lifetime of a thread on
news boards is several days, which is derived from the strict rule defining the period within
which a post can be made on threads. There is no strict rule for the remaining five boards, and
the average lifetimes are considerably longer than those of the news boards.
We label threads by n ∈ {1, · · · ,N}, and N is the total number of threads that appear
on the board. We describe the tth post to the board at s[sec] by the thread number n and s
9/29
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Fig. 3. Scatterplot of post data (n(t), s(t)) for the No. 5 and No. 8 boards. Each dot corresponds to a post.
as (n(t), s(t)), t = 1, · · · , T . We measure the post time s by setting the time of the first post
time on the board as zero seconds. We present the scatterplot of the time series post data
(n(t), s(t)), t = 1, · · · , T in the (n, s) plane of the No. 5 and No. 8 boards in Fig. 3. Because the
threads have a strict finite lifetime of five days on the No. 5 board, the plot shows a narrow
strip pattern. Some threads have a longer lifetime because they have a long family tree from
ancestors to descendants. The No. 8 board shows a wide strip pattern, which indicates that
the number of threads is considerably large.
4.1 Correlation function C(τ) for equilibrium r
We identify threads and posts as candidates and votes in the voting model in Fig. 4. As
previously shown, when voting occurs with reference to the previous r votes, the stationary
distribution of the r consecutive previous votes obeys the Pitman sampling formula in (11). In
this case, the correlation between n(t) and n(t−τ) for the voting lag τ does not decay for τ < r,
as the distribution is stationary in r consecutive votes. In the range τ > r, C(τ) dumps, so if a
post on the board is described by this voting model with reference r, C(τ) should demonstrate
this feature. We adopt the expectation value of the coincidence of n(t) and n(t − τ) as the
10/29
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Fig. 4. Posts, threads, and a board. A board is represented as a rectangle with rounded corners. Posts are
shown as balls and are labeled as t. There are Kr = 6 threads with a non-zero number of posts. n shows the
threads numbers. The ”21st post? refers to the previous 10 posts, t = 11, 12, · · · .10. The thread numbers are n =
5, 9, 11, 16, 18, 10 and appear (k5, k9, k11,K16, k18, k10) = (3, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1) times, respectively. The multiplicities a
are a1 = 3, a2 = 2 and a3 = 1. a1 + a2 + a3 = Kr = 6 and 1 · a1 + 2 · · ·a2 + 3 · a3 = 10 hold. The probability of a
post on a thread with two posts is 2 · 2−α
θ+10
. The probability of a thread not appearing in ten posts is θ+6·α
θ+10
.
correlation between n(t) and n(t − τ),
C(τ) ≡ E(δn(t),n(t−τ)).
We assume thatC(τ) does not depend on t, and we estimate it using time series data {n(t)}, t =
1, · · · , T as
C(τ) =
1
T − τ
T−τ∑
t=1
δn(t),n(t+τ).
Fig.5. illustrates the semi-logarithmic plot C(τ) vs. τ. The properties of C(τ) of a voting
model with finite r are summarized in.24) We see a plateau structure in which C(τ) does not
decrease with τ for the first five news boards in the left panel. For the No. 4 and No. 5
boards, C(τ) is almost constant for τ ≤ τc ≃ 80. As for the other boards, C(τ) decreases
for τ ≥ τc = 20 for the No. 1 and No. 2 boards and for smaller values of τc ∼ 5 for the
No. 3 board. In these news boards, C(τ) is almost constant among posts within τc. On the
other hand, C(τ) decreases with τ for the latter boards in the right panel, with the exception
of the No. 8 board. As for the No. 8 board, C(τ) is large for large τ and gradually decreases,
indicating that the board has special features.
We apply the voting model to the posts on 2ch.net in the boards for the news category
with r < τc. We adopt r = 80 for the No. 4 and No. 5 boards, r = 20 for the No. 1 and No.
11/29
J. Phys. Soc. Jpn.
Fig. 5. Plot ofC(τ) vs. τ. The left (right) panel shows the results for the first (remaining) five boards. τ on the
x-axis indicates the voting lag and C(τ) denotes the auto-correlation function between n(t) and n(t + τ).
2 boards, and r = 5 for the No. 3 board. To interpret τc, we highlight the response times of
board users. We believe that a user needs several minutes to respond to posts. Next, the post
should be random for a short time interval, and the probability of a post on a thread is roughly
estimated as the post ratio in the previous posts. In the last column of Table I, we indicate the
time horizon sH[sec] for τc, which is defined as the mean duration between posts multiplied
by τc, as
sH ≡
s(T ) − s(1)
T − 1
· τc. (14)
sH is about 1.5 to 4 minutes, which is possibly the requisite time duration to respond to posts.
4.2 Estimation of the parameters θandα
We use time series data {n(t)}, t = 1, · · · , T , n ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and estimate the model param-
eters θ and α using the maximum likelihood principle. In the model, the probability of a post
on a thread that appears in the past r posts kˆ times is defined as in (1). The probability of a
12/29
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post to akˆ threads with kˆ is
PExisting(kˆ) = akˆ ·
kˆ − α
θ + r
. (15)
The probability of a post on a new thread that does not appear in the past r posts depends on
the number of threads Kr in the past r posts and is defined in (2):
PNew(Kr) =
Krα + θ
θ + r
. (16)
For t ∈ [1 × 104, T − r], we choose tn, n = 1, · · · S randomly and study the following r + 1
sequence, n(tn), n(tn + 1), · · · , n(tn + r − 1). We estimate the number of threads Kr and the
number of threads with kˆ posts akˆ in the past r posts.
∑
kˆ akˆ = Kr holds. If thread n(tn+ r) does
not exist in the Kr threads, the likelihood is PNew(Kr). If the thread exists and thread n(tn + r)
appears kˆ times, the likelihood is PExisting(kˆ). The likelihood of S sample is then estimated by
the products of these likelihoods for all s = 1, · · · , S . We adopt S = 2×105. In addition, we fit
the parameters using the maximum likelihood principle for the distribution of the partitions
of akˆ with the Pitman sampling formula in (11).
Table II. Fitting results of θ and α for probabilistic rules in (15) and (16). We use the maximum likelihood
principle, and the sample number S is 2 × 105. We show the estimates for the No. 1 and No. 2 boards with
r = 20, for the No. 3 board with r = 5, and for the No. 4 and No. 5 boards with r = 80 in the third and fourth
columns. For r = 5 and r = 20, we show the goodness-of-fit results using the Pitman sampling formula in (11)
in the fifth and sixth columns. We adopt the same samples for the two fittings. The standard error (S.E.) in the
last digit of the estimate is provided in parentheses.
Fit with Probabilistic Rules Fit with Pitman’s Distribution
No. r θ(S.E.) α(S.E.) θ(S.E.) α(S.E.)
1 20 8.8(2) 0.37(1) 8.7(0) 0.390(2)
2 20 2.2(1) 0.42(1) 2.0(0) 0.418(2)
3 5 1.7(0) 0.560(4) 1.3(0) 0.623(3)
4 80 10.0(3) 0.35(1) NA NA
5 80 11.9(4) 0.28(1) NA NA
The estimated values for the parameters are summarized in Table II. We adopted r = 20
for the No. 1 and No. 2 boards, r = 5 for the No. 3 board, and r = 80 for the No. 4 and No. 5
boards by the correlation analysis. The standard errors are estimated using the square root of
the negative eigenvalue for the Hessian of the log likelihood. For r = 80, we only show the
results by fitting with probabilistic rules.
To verify the probabilistic rules, we directly estimate PExissting(kˆ) and PNew(Kr). We cal-
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Fig. 6. Plots of PExisting(kˆ) vs. kˆ and PNew(Kr) vs. Kr . The symbols denote the estimated results using
PˆExisting(kˆ) in (17) and PˆKr (Kr) in (18). The lines denote the plots of (15) and (16) with fitted parameters for θ
and α in Table II.
culate the number of threads with post times kˆ for the past r posts and denote it as N(kˆ). In
addition, we count the number of times a post is made on an exiting thread with posts kˆ and
denote it as Npost(kˆ). The estimator for PExisting(kˆ) is
PˆExisting(kˆ) =
NPost(kˆ)
N(kˆ)
. (17)
Likewise, we count the number of threads Kr and the number of times a post is made on
a new thread when the number of threads is Kr. We denote them as NKr(Kr) and NNew(Kr),
respectively. The estimator for PNew(Kr) is then denoted as
PˆNew(Kr) =
NNew(Kr)
NKr (Kr)
. (18)
Fig. 6 presents the estimates for PˆExisting(kˆ) and Pˆnew(Kr). We also plot PExisting(kˆ) and
PNew(Kr) in (15) and (16) with fitted values for θ and α in Table II. The estimated results for
the maximum likelihood fit well with the results from the estimators PˆExisting(kˆ) and PˆNew(Kr).
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The parameters fall in zone II, which was introduced in the previous section. In this zone, it
is difficult for a leader to appear.
4.3 Distribution of Kr and kˆ
We compare (11) and the probability mass function for Kr using the fitted parameters in
Table II and those of an empirical distribution. The probability mass function Pr(Kr) for the
number of candidates Kr with reference r is given as
Pr(Kr) =
θ[r:α]
θ[r]
c(r,Kr, α)α
−Kr , (19)
where c(r,Kr, α) is the generalized Stirling number or the C-numbers.
9) As for the probability
mass function for the post times kˆ, we calculate the number of posts kˆ1st ≥ kˆ2nd ≥ kˆ3rd for the
most popular three threads in the past r posts in addition to all post times kˆ for all threads. We
plot the results in Fig. 7.
As we can see, the fitting results are good. The distributions of kˆ1st, kˆ2nd, kˆ3rd, kˆ, and Kr
are well described by the Pitman sampling formula (11) and Pr(Kr) with fitted parameters
for θ, α in Table II. We present the results for the statistical test using Kolmogorov–Smirnov
(KS) statistics in Appendix C.
4.4 Distribution of total votes cn(T )
In this subsection, we discuss the distribution of total votes cn(T ) for thread n, where
cn(t) =
∑t
t′=1 δn(t′),n. Fig. 8 shows the semi-logarithmic plot of the cumulative distribution
P(k) ≡ P(cn(T ) ≥ k) vs. k. The left (right) panel depicts the results for the first (remaining)
five boards. The dotted line denotes the cumulative distribution of the log-normal distribu-
tion with the same mean and variance. As is clearly shown, the results show good fits. In
the previous subsection, we confirm that the distribution of posts on the four boards obey
the equilibrium Pitman sampling formula. The difference between the equilibrium and non-
equilibrium suggests that the posting process for a large r is not described by the voting
process.
In the remaining boards, we confirm that the distribution of the number of posts on the No.
8 board follow the power-law distribution, and the power-law index is 1.65, P(k) ∼ k−(1.65−1).
We have seen that the board has a long memory in Fig.5. Furthermore, we can confirm that
the probability of a post is proportional to the number of posts and that of a new thread
is proportional to the number of threads for a large r in Fig.9. As r increases, the latter
dependence disappears, and the process is described by the Yule process.12) As the power-law
exponent is less than two, the fitness model for evolving networks might be a better candidate
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Fig. 7. Plots of the distribution of post times kˆ and number of threads Kr In the past r posts for data with
symbols and for (11) and (19). We sort kˆ in descending order and select the largest three values kˆ1 ≥ kˆ2 ≥ kˆ3.
The symbols , ◦, and △ denote the empirical distributions of kˆ1, kˆ2, and kˆ3, respectively. ^ and ▽ show the
distribution of all kˆ and Kr . The lines indicate the plots of Pr(Kr) in (19) and the distributions of the ordered kˆ j
and kˆ, which are calculated using the Pitman sampling formula in eq.(11). We adopt r = 20(80) for the No. 1
and No. 2 (No. 4 and No. 5) boards. The parameters for (11) and (19) are presented in Table II. We adopt the
second set for r = 20 and the first set for r = 80.
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Fig. 8. Plot of P(k) ≡ P(cn(T ) ≥ k) vs. k. The left (right) panel presents the results for the
first (remaining) five boards. The means and standard deviations of c j for the first five boards are
(3.93, 1.41), (4.79, 1.48), (3.03, 1.10), (4.76, 1.45), and (5.47, 1.47).
to describe the posting process.25, 26)
5. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we discuss choice behavior using a voting model comprising voters and
candidates. Voters vote for a candidate with a probability that is proportional to the ratio of
previous votes, which is visible to the voters. In addition, voters can obtain information from
a finite number r of the most recent previous voters.
In the large t limit, the system is equilibrated, and the partition of r votes follows the
Pitman sampling formula. Kirman’s ant colony model is a special case that corresponds to
the number of states K = 2. The equilibrium probability distribution and the non-equilibrium
probability distribution for t = r are the same. We propose using this voting model for the
posting process of a BBS, 2ch.net, where users can select one of many threads to make a
post. We explore how this choice depends on the last r posts and the distribution of the last r
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Fig. 9. Plot of PExisting(kˆ) vs. PNew(Kr) for the No. 8 board. The symbols show the estimated results using
PˆExisting(kˆ) in (17) and PˆKr (Kr) in (18). The lines denote the plots of (15) and (16).
posts across boards. We conclude that the posting data in the news category is described by
the voting model. The equilibrium time or time horizon sH is about 1.5-4 minutes. Up to this
time horizon, the probability of posting on a thread is proportional to the ratio of posts on the
thread.
When the number of candidates K is fixed at θ = −Kα for α < 0, we show that the
Dirichlet multinomial distribution reduces to the Pitman sampling formula in Appendix A.
In Appendix B, we show an application to parliament election data for Japan. We ignore the
inhomogeneities among the candidates in the elections. The model has only one parameter θ.
We estimate the correlation strength between votes as 1/(θ + 1) and show that the correlation
between votes becomes stronger after the introduction of the small constituency system in
1993.
Recently, a wide variety of social systems, including election votes, citations of scientific
papers, rating dynamics on E-commerce, and social tagging systems, have been extensively
studied27–31) using simple probabilistic models. We hope our study provides a new perspective
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from an equilibrium viewpoint in a non-equilibrium system.
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Appendix A: Fixed number of candidates case
We model the voting of K candidates, C1 · · ·CK . At time t, candidate C j has c j(t) votes.
In this appendix, we consider the case in which the number of candidates K is fixed, that is,
no new entry is allowed. In each time step, one voter votes for one candidate; the voting is
sequential. Hence, at time t, the tth voter votes, after which the total number of votes is t.
Voters are allowed to see r previous votes for each candidate and, thus, are aware of public
perception. r is a constant number. We consider the case in which all voters vote for the
candidate with a probability proportional to the previous votes ratio, which is visible to the
voters.
The transition is
c j(t) = k → k + 1 : P j,k,t:l,t−r =
q j(1−ρ)
ρ
+ (k − l)
1−ρ
ρ
+ r
=
β j + (k − l)
θ + r
, (A·1)
where c j(t − r) = l, ρ is the correlation coefficient, and q j is the initial constant of the jth
candidate.17) ρ is the correlation of the beta binomial model. The constraint
∑K
j=1 q j = 1
exists. We define θ = (1 − ρ)/ρ and β j = q j(1 − ρ)/ρ. P j,k,t:l,t−r denotes the probabilities of
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the process. The voting ratio for C j at t − r is c j(t − r) = l. We consider the case β j ≥ 0 from
P j,k,t:l,t−r > 0 and the constraint
∑
j β j = θ. When β j = β, the constraint becomes βK = θ.
We consider the hopping rate among (r + 1) states kˆ j = k− l, kˆ j = 0, 1, · · · , r. In each step
of t, the vote at time (t − r) is deleted, and a new vote is obtained. kˆ is the number of votes
candidate C j obtained in the latest r votes. In case K = 2, the model becomes Kirman’s ant
colony model.16) The dynamic evolution of the process is given by
kˆ j → kˆ j + 1 : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j+1,t =
r − kˆ j
r
β j + kˆ j
θ + r − 1
,
kˆ j → kˆ j − 1 : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j−1,t =
kˆ j
r
(θ − β j) + (r − 1 − kˆ j)
θ + r − 1
,
kˆ j → kˆ j : Pkˆ j ,kˆ j ,t = 1 − Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t − Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t.
Pkˆ j ,kˆ j±1,t are the probabilities of the process and the products of exit votes and new entry votes.
We consider hopping from candidate Ci to C j.
kˆi → kˆi − 1, kˆ j → kˆ j + 1 : Pkˆi→kˆi−1,kˆ j→kˆ j+1,t =
kˆi
r
β j + kˆ j
θ + r − 1
,
kˆi − 1 → kˆi, kˆ j + 1 → kˆ j : Pkˆi−1→kˆi ,kˆ j+1→kˆ j ,t
=
kˆ j + 1
r
βi + kˆi − 1
θ + r − 1
.
Here, we define µr(kˆ, t) as a distribution function of the state kˆ at time t. The number of all
states is (r + 1). Given that the process is reversible, we have
µr(kˆi, kˆ j, t)
µr(kˆi − 1, kˆ j + 1, t)
=
kˆ j + 1
kˆi
βi + kˆi − 1
β j + kˆ j
. (A·2)
We can separate indexes i and j and obtain
µir(kˆi, t)
µir(kˆi − 1, t)
=
βi + kˆi − 1
kˆi
c
µ
j
r(kˆ j + 1, t)
µ
j
r(kˆ j, t)
=
β j + kˆ j
kˆ j + 1
c, (A·3)
where c is a constant. Using (A·3) sequentially, in the limit t → ∞, we can obtain the equi-
librium distribution, which can be written as
µr(a,∞) =
 θ + r − 1r

−1
K∏
j=1
 β j + kˆ j − 1kˆ j
 , (A·4)
where a = (kˆ1, kˆ2, · · · , kˆK). This distribution is written as
µr(a,∞) =
r!
θ[r]
K∏
i=1
β
[kˆi]
i
kˆi!
, (A·5)
22/29
J. Phys. Soc. Jpn.
where x[n] = x(x + 1) · · · (x + n − 1). This is the Dirichlet multinomial distribution.
Here, we set β j = β. The relation β = −α exists, where α is the parameter used in the
main text. We write (A·4) as
µr(aˆ,∞) =
 θ + r − 1r

−1
r∏
j=1
 β + j − 1j

a j
, (A·6)
where a j is the number of candidates for whom j voters voted and aˆ = (a1, · · · , ar). Hence,
the relations
∑r
i=1 ai = Kr < K and
∑r
i=1 iai = r exist. Here, we define Kr as the number of
candidates who have more than one vote. (K − Kr) candidates have no vote.
We consider the partitions of integer Kr. To normalize, we add the term of combination:
K!/a1! · · · ar!(K − Kr)!. We obtain
µr(aˆ,∞)
=
K!
a1! · · · ar!(K − Kr)!
 θ + r − 1r

−1
r∏
j=1
 β + j − 1j

a j
=
r!θ[Kr :−β]
θ[r]
r∏
j=1
(
(1 + β)[ j−1]
j!
)a j
1
a j!
, (A·7)
where x[n:−β] = x(x − β) · · · (x − (n − 1)β). We use the relation θ = Kβ. (A·7) is simply the
Pitman sampling formula.9)
In the limit β → 0 and K → ∞, subject to a fixed θ = βK, we can obtain the Ewens
sampling formula. In this case, the sum of the probabilities that a candidate who has zero
votes can obtain one vote is θ/(θ + r). This case is the same as α = 0 in Section 2.
Appendix B: Data analysis of election data
In this appendix, we study the distribution of vote shares in the elections for Japan’s House
of Representatives. Previously, we proposed a mechanical model that is based on a voting
model and certain assumptions about the inhomogeneities of candidates.32) We describe the
vote shares of candidates of a political party as the mixture of the votes of fixed supporters
of the political party in the region and the votes of floating voters, which obeys the Dirichlet
distribution. The former group becomes a source of the inhomogeneity of the system. Here,
we neglect the inhomogeneities and treat all candidates equally.
B.1 Election data
We study data from the 28th general election in 1958 to the 47th general election in 2014
and find a change in the election system. A middle constituency system was adopted prior to
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the 40th election such that the number of winners in each district is generally between three
and five. In the case of the correction of congress seats, there are districts with 2–6 congress
seats, which are rare cases. Following the 40th election in 1993, a small constituency system
was installed, and only one person was elected from each district. In the analysis of election
data, we used a dataset33) that records the election results in several small regions in each
electoral district. We separate the election data before and after the introduction of the small
constituency system. Next, we classify data on the basis of the number of congress seats W
and that of candidates K. Table B·1 shows the sample number case (W,K). Hereafter, we only
study the case (W,K) in which the sample number is more than 103. For W = 1, a small
constituency system, we study K = 3, 4, 5. For 2 ≤ W ≤ 5, a middle constituency system, we
examine K = 4, 5, 6, 7 for W = 3, K = 6, 7, 8, 9 for W = 4 and K = 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 for W = 5,
respectively.
Table B·1. Number of samples in case (K,W). Election data are classified by the number of congressional
seats W and that of candidates K in the electoral districts. The second column presents the results for the
elections under the small constituency system. The third, fourth, and fifth columns provide the results for W =
3, 4, 5 for the elections under the middle constituency system.
K\W 1 3 4 5
2 814 NA NA NA
3 9,868 NA NA NA
4 5,650 1,050 NA NA
5 1,762 4,413 846 NA
6 428 3,422 3,638 1,062
7 115 1,652 4,104 4,613
8 18 562 2,850 5,358
9 6 227 1,112 4,511
10 NA 65 497 2,369
11 NA 81 148 796
B.2 Parameter estimation
In the elections, the number of candidates K is fixed and the model parameters θ, α should
satisfy α < 0 and θ = −Kα. We estimate the model parameter θ using themaximum likelihood
principle. As for r, we adopt r = 50, 100 and the Dirichlet limit r → ∞. For a finite r, we
transform the vote share vi, i = 1, · · · ,K into votes kˆi, i = 1, · · · ,K as kˆi = ⌊r · vi⌋. Here, ⌊x⌋
is the floor function. As for the treatment of fractions r · vi − kˆi, we distribute the remaining
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votes r −
∑
i kˆi to kˆi with the largest fractions.
The results are presented in Table B·2. The estimated parameters θ for (W,K) in the three
cases are almost the same. The parameters are in zone III, which is introduced in Section III.
In this region, it is difficult to be the stable leader. As the number of winners W increases,
the correlation decreases for the same number of candidates K. This finding means that the
correlation strengthened following the introduction of the small constituency system in 1993.
To check the fit of the Pitman sampling formula (11) for θ = −Kα, we plot the distribution
of kˆi for r = 100 and i ≤ 5 for the 12 cases in Fig. B·1. The middle constituency systemW , 1
results show a good fit. On the other hand, this is not the case for the small constituency
system, W = 1 because we neglected the inhomogeneities of the system, which affect the
voting results, particularly in the small constituency system.
Appendix C: Goodness-of-fit test for 2ch.net data
Given the observed dataset and the Pitman sampling formula, we test whether the empiri-
cal data are truly drawn from the formula. A standard approach is to perform a goodness-of-fit
test, which generates a p-value that quantifies the plausibility of the hypothesis. To adopt the
procedure, it is necessary to introduce a measure of the distance between the distribution of
the empirical data and the Pitman sampling formula. This distance is compared with distance
measurements for comparable synthetic datasets drawn from the Pitman sampling formula,
and the p-value is defined as the fraction of the synthetic distances that are larger than the em-
pirical distance.34) If the p-value is rather small, one can reject the Pitman sampling formula
as a plausible fit to the data.
The Pitman sampling formula provides a probability for each decomposition aˆ =
(a1, a2, · · · , ar) of integer r as
∑
j ja j = r. Kr is defined as Kr =
∑
j a j. We adopt the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic as a measure quantifying the distance between the Pit-
man sampling formula and the empirical data. We explain the procedure below, which is
based on the goodness-of-fit test of power laws.34)
• First, we randomly choose S sequences of length r from the post data {n(t)}, t = 1, · · · , T .
We then randomly draw S integers tn, n = 1, · · · , S from {10
4, · · · , T − r} and choose S
sequences as (n(tn), n(tn + 1), · · · , n(tn + r − 1)).
• We calculate the decomposition aˆn for the sequence (n(tn), n(tn + 1), · · · , n(tn + r − 1) and
obtain the empirical distribution of the decomposition of r. We then use the maximum
likelihood principle to estimate (θ, α). In addition, we estimate the KS statistics for this fit.
We define the KS statistics as the maximum distance between the cumulative distribution
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Fig. B·1. Plots of the distribution of ck for k ≤ 5 and r = 100. We choose the three cases with the largest
sample numbers forW ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5}.
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Table B·2. θ for (K,W),r = 50
θ(K,W) W = 1 3 4 5
K = 3 3.2755(5)
4 3.9188(9) 7.56(2)
5 4.603(3) 7.150(4)
6 6.146(3) 8.634(5) 14.81(7)
7 5.772(4) 7.575(3) 10.682(6)
8 7.913(4) 10.366(4)
9 7.401(8) 8.684(3)
10 8.635(5)
Table B·3. θ for (K,W),r = 100
θ(K,W) W = 1 3 4 5
K = 3 3.1341(4)
4 3.7544(8) 6.80(1)
5 4.414(2) 6.473(2)
6 5.603(2) 7.730(3) 12.51(3)
7 5.363(3) 6.954(2) 9.354(3)
8 7.169(3) 9.078(2)
9 6.870(6) 7.835(2)
10 7.781(3)
Table B·4. θ for (K,W) in the Dirichlet limit (r → ∞)
θ(K,W) W = 1 3 4 5
K = 3 3.0062(3)
4 3.568(1) 6.112(9)
5 4.175(2) 5.786(1)
6 5.060(1) 6.906(2) 10.38(2)
7 5.000(1) 6.289(1) 8.017(2)
8 6.463(2) 7.804(1)
9 6.376(3) 7.110(1)
10 7.129(2)
functions (CDFs) of the data and the fitted model:
D = max|S (aˆ) − P(aˆ)|.
Here, Pr(aˆ) is the CDF of the Pitman sampling formula that best fits the data and S (aˆ) is
the CDF of the data. In calculating the CDFs, we order aˆ according to size.
• We generate the Pitman sampling formula for the distributed synthetic datasets with pa-
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rameters θ, α equal to those of the distribution that best fits the above data. The sample
number is S . We fit the synthetic data to the Pitman sampling formula and calculate the
KS statistics. We repeat the procedure 2,500 times and obtain the same number of KS
statistics. Then, we estimate the 90% point KS 90% of the distribution of the KS statistics.
In general, we can count the fraction of the synthetic samples whose KS value is larger
than the value for the empirical data and treat it as the p-value for the empirical data.
Instead, we calculate the ratio KS/KS 90%, where KS in the numerator is the KS statistic
for the empirical data. If the ratio is greater than one, the empirical data’s p-value is less
than 10%. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the empirical data obeys the Pitman
sampling formula. Undoubtedly, even if the p-value is large, it does not guarantee that
the Pitman sampling formula is the correct distribution of the data. Some other model
may prove to be a better fit to the data. In addition, if the sample size S is too small, the
p-value could become large. We avoid the latter by adopting S = 3× 104. In addition, we
estimate the ratio KS/KS 90% because one can use its value as the proxy for the difference
between the Pitman sampling formula and the empirical data.
Fig. C·1. Plot of KS/KS 90% vs. r for the first five boards, No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. r ∈
{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20}.
We estimate the ratio KS/KS 90% for the first five boards. The number of partitions aˆ of r
for r = 3 is 3, 3 = 1+1+1 = 2+1+3.We use two parameters as the fit, and there are no degrees
of freedom. For r = 4, there are five partitions, 4 = 1+1+1+1 = 2+1+1 = 2+2 = 3+1 = 4.
The degree of freedom that fits is 5 − 2 − 1 = 2. Here, we adopt an r that is greater than
four as r ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20}. As r increases, the number of partitions rapidly
increases. For r = 20, there are 627 partitions, and the remaining degrees of freedom is 624.
28/29
J. Phys. Soc. Jpn.
We illustrate the results in Fig.C·1. We can see that the ratio is less than one for the No.
1 board with r = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and the No. 5 board with r = 4. For the large r for these two
boards and other boards, the Pitman sampling formula is rejected.
Appendix D: Additional information about BBS 2ch.net
In this appendix, we provide supplementary information about 2ch.net and the dataset
studied here. 2ch.net is a collection of multiple BBS and was founded in May 1999. Accord-
ing to a NetRating survey, the number of 2ch.net users in 2009 was 11.7 million.
To obtain post data for 2ch.net, we chose ten boards for several genres, as shown in Table
I. The first five board genres are news, and the other five belong to various other genres. The
program processes the HTML files and extracts the number of threads on the boards. All
threads have a 10-digit ID, a post date, and an ID of the user who made the post. The IDs are
randomly assigned by 2ch.net to maintain user anonymity. If the thread is in sequence with a
previous thread, we record the ancestor’s thread ID.
The data and R scripts to generate the figures presented in this study are available online:
https://202.24.143.74/2ch. The data for the No. k board is denoted by k.csv and comprises
(s(t), n(t), id(t)), t = 1, · · · , T in three columns.
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